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T H E  USE OF RATIONAL SYSTEMS IN BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY ORGANIZATIONS: A DILEMMA FOR 
FINANCIAL MANAGERS 
PHILIP BROMILEY AND K.J. EUSKE* 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been decades since financial managers were trained to believe that 
employees and organizations could be handled as if everyone was a simple 
rational cog in a big machine. Cognitive limits to rationality, motivational 
theories, leadership, and human relations theories are all based on deviations 
from the simple rational model of man. Yet management technology is still 
dominated heavily by systems which are fundamentally based on the assumptions 
of economic rationality. 
If people and organizations differ from the implicit assumptions of a manage- 
ment technique, managers should be seriously concerned that the technique is 
not producing the outcomes promised and may in fact be producing harmful 
outcomes which are not anticipated by the providers of the technology. 
Management techniques such as Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
Systems (PPBS), Management by Objectives (MBO), and Zero-Based 
Budgeting (ZBB) rest upon the rational model. While studies in the manage- 
ment and accounting literature have analyzed the appropriateness of some of 
these techniques (c.f., Jablonsky and Dirsmith, 1978; Dirsmith and Jablonsky, 
1979a; and Dirsmith and Jablonsky, 1979b) and, more generally, the rational 
model (Staw, 1980) in various environments, rationally-based techniques 
continue to be adopted regardless of the empirical assessment of their desirability. 
Years after the US federal government had discarded PPBS, other govern- 
ments continued to adopt it. Zero-based budgeting swept through the USA just 
as PPBS did with many organizations adopting it without evidence of its utility 
in their environment. MBO systems have received mixed evaluations - 
partially resulting from differences in the techniques and values used in 
evaluating the systems Uablonsky and Dirsmith, 1979a). However, MBO 
systems are still actively being implemented. For instance, in 1979 the US 
Army implemented what is essentially an MBO system for officer performance 
appraisal. Since all such systems have implementation and operations costs as 
well as some potential impact on performance of the organization, their 
appropriateness is of critical importance to the government manager. 
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This article discusses some general weaknesses of rationally-based manage- 
ment techniques. To  make the discussion more concrete, examples of the 
weaknesses in one management technology, MBO, are discussed with a 
recognition that similar weaknesses are present in other rationally-based 
systems. This article is intended neither to review all of the literature on the 
advantages and disadvantages of MBO (let alone all rationally-based techniques) 
nor to present the management technique which will resolve the problems of 
management. Rather this article looks at rationally- based techniques and seeks 
to address the question, ‘How can we deal with them given their sometimes 
obvious problems?’ 
We first review MBO in relation to a number of concepts in the organizational 
literature, and then suggest some possible changes in the implementation of 
MBO. 
MBO - A RATIONAL SYSTEM 
The underlying structure of MBO assumes the ability to develop hierarchical 
chains of objectives from the most overarching goals of the organization down 
to the lowest level of organizational activity. The identified objectives are to be 
linked with the job responsibilities and resource use in the various parts of the 
organization. In many cases, the development of the hierarchical chains and 
the definition of the job responsibilities and resource use are one and the same 
activity. Thus there are at least two sides to the MBO structure. The first is a 
consistent, rational, hierarchical structure of objectives that leads to relations 
among all organizational activities and the organization’s most important 
objectives. The second is the use of such objectives for managerial functions 
such as to control, manage, motivate, and reward appropriate behavior and 
use of resources by individuals in the organization. 
The managerial functions of MBO imply the development of objectives that 
are clearly defined and measurable. The measurable objectives are normally 
identified with budget allocations to the responsible manager. The financial 
manager provides the expertise to translate the objectives into budgetary terms 
and to track the use of the resources to meet specific objectives. Involving the 
individual manager in developing operational objectives and resource require- 
ments ostensibly generates commitment to those objectives. Managing on the 
basis of those objectives hopefully sparks individuals to use their creativity to 
reach organizational goals - resulting in increased effectiveness. Evaluating 
the individual based on the accomplishment of such objectives rewards those 
who are most productive and reinforces the importance of the objectives and 
behaviors which achieve those objectives. MBO emphasizes the accomplish- 
ment of objectives which are of direct value to the organization rather than 
actions performed or use of inputs. To make the system work, the objectives 
must be clear and operational so that the individual can perform without 
excessive ambiguity concerning what is required and how it will be measured. 
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Thus, in the best of all possible worlds MBO is a management system that 
ensures or at least reinforces a set of highly motivated individuals working 
toward clearly defined organizational objectives. However, strict applications 
of MBO can be counter-productive. The following section identifies how a 
strict application of MBO could reduce organizational effectiveness. 
ORGANIZATIONAL IDEAS 
Different theories illuminate different perspectives of organizational behavior 
(c.f., Allison, 1971). That is, different models highlight different aspects of the 
system. A practical example is in the way different consulting professionals 
would arrive and make totally different analyses of the same problem. Say you 
were uncomfortable with the way your payroll system works. A computer 
systems consultant might provide a new payroll data-processing system. A 
psychologist might focus on supervisor - subordinate interactions. A time study 
and organizational systems person might time employees filling out reports. 
And so on. The consultants’ frames of reference provide different and not 
necessarily consistent perceptions of the organization. This section will take a 
number of ideas from the organizational literature and discuss how these may be 
relevant to the interaction of the financial manager with MBO as a management 
system. 
The first idea is that the difference between objectives and constraints is 
largely arbitrary (Simon, 1964). In an operations research example, one can 
reach the same maximum by maximizing quality subject to a cost constraint or 
by minimizing costs subject to the appropriate quality constraint. In the MBO 
system, while the objectives were intended to free the manager from an overly 
detailed procedural job definition, the repeated honing of definitions of objec- 
tives may have the opposite effect - that of obtaining definitions of objectives 
so precise that they stifle opportunities for innovation and increased productivity. 
Such honing could seem innocuous: replacing monthly objectives with weekly 
objectives. But weekly objectives, if taken seriously, mean that the organization 
cannot take time for building - for activities which may incur costs in this 
period but pay off in the long term.’ Thus, continued honing and tracking of 
objectives can result in a management structure which rigidly constrains the 
manager and does so in a manner which is even worse than the undefined or 
implicit system. By replacing an implicit procedural set of constraints (the 
manager must operate an employment ofice) with an explicit set of highly 
tuned ‘objective’ constraints (the manager will maintain the same number of 
placements per period), one can create a situation where the manager is even 
more constrained than previously, with obvious implications for innovation 
and managerial elan. 
The second and perhaps most important concept is the idea of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1976). Bounded rationality refers to the idea that individuals 
attempt to be rational but face severe limits on their ability to handle informa- 
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tion. In economics, the totally rational manager knows the total cost of producing 
another unit of output at all output levels and the quantity of output saleable at 
all prices. Thus an optimally profitable level of output can be set. In the bounded 
rationality perspective one recognizes that the manager knows some of the costs 
of output but has only the roughest conceptions of the total cost including all 
corporate and staff costs, and at best only knows the effects of price changes on 
sales near the current price level (and even that is a bit weak since different 
marketing strategies can change the sales at a given price). Thus a manager 
with bounded rationality thinks about management in a very different way 
than ‘economic man’ - relying on feedback from the market and rules of thumb 
such as constant mark-up pricing. In the public sector, the totally rational 
manager also knows the total cost of producing another unit of output or service 
at all levels, and all possible combinations of outputs which can be produced at 
any budget level. In  reality such is not the case. The economists assume that the 
rational public manager also knows the contribution to the public good of each 
marginal dollar and so can allocate funds to maximize the public welfare. The 
real public manager relies on feedback from voters and politicians in judging 
which programs should incrementally grow and which should have reduced 
funding. 
In thinking about the problems of bounded rationality in MBO systems, two 
obvious difficulties arise. First, the cause and effect connections that one needs 
to link the organizational behaviors with the top level organizational objectives 
are in many cases unknown. No one has the wisdom and mental abilities to 
provide an integrated and overarching understanding of all the organization’s 
activities. But without that kind of overarching wisdom, it is quite likely that 
the objectives enunciated will be contradictory and perhaps even mutually 
destructive. The objectives and goals of one unit are very often achieved at 
direct cost to other units. For example, a central purchasing agency’s objective 
of minimizing unit cost through large purchases conflicts with the local 
managers’ objective of maintaining resource flexibility at the local level. 
The second direct implication of bounded rationality is that the definition of 
objectives is going to be faulty. Given the need to use these objectives for short- 
term evaluation, the tendency is to disregard all objectives that are longer term 
(Hayes and Abernathy, 1980). For example, a health care agency may have an 
objective of eradicating tuberculosis in a particular geographic area. However, 
eradication of the disease is not particularly useful for evaluating the operation 
of mobile treatment units. Therefore, a more short-term objective is identified 
for the mobile units, such as perform N number of X-rays per day. In addition, 
the objectives can only be partially defined even in today’s context. The 
measurement of that objective will be less than perfect (Euske, 1983). Conse- 
quently, taking the measured objectives as complete would result in reinforcing 
only part of the job and a part that may miss some important facets of the 
organization’s needs. For example, Blau (1956) found a system that focused 
employment service personnel on performing interviews as opposed to placing 
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the unemployed. In that particular situation the job counselor’s performance 
was measured by the number of individuals who were interviewed for job 
placement. Actual job placement was not considered in the performance 
measurement system and was consequently ignored by the job counselors. 
Further related to the inability to define objectives is the possibility that it 
may be useful for parts of the organization to do things which the organization 
as a whole does not advocate. It may be productive to engage in ‘hypocritical’ 
activities (March, 1976); parts of the organization may learn by trying out 
ideas and behaviors which other parts of the organization find improper. Thus, 
a portion of the organization might try to decentralize resource allocation 
decisions in spite of an organizational tradition of centralized decisions. Such 
decentralization might provide for a more effective and efficient allocation of 
resources. In order to implement public policy, a portion of the organization 
may need to adapt to local styles of business in a manner which the organization 
does not allow. But the formal mechanisms of management by objectives 
assume that the top objectives are fully consistent with the lower ones and can 
be written in a manner that such adaptation is unnecessary. 
In addition to the limits on understanding the current organization, 
managers also have to face the fact that they have even less understanding of 
future organizations. Karl Weick has proposed that ‘plans are not a blueprint 
to future success but are rather an interpretation of the past extended into the 
future. Plans seem to exist in a context ofjustification more than in a context of 
anticipation. They refer more to what has been accomplished than to what is 
yet to be accomplished’ (Weick, 1969, p. 102). 
In attempting to plan the future of the organization, realistic planning 
requires an understanding of the current organization and situation, but the 
primary problems of the future are rooted in the unforeseeable. Rather than 
relying on planning for effective behavior patterns, organizations have tradi- 
tionally relied on feedback and adaptation (Cyert and March, 1963). Rather 
than a pattern of behavior which requires adequate forecasting of future 
events, the firm may choose a less risky strategy of taking actions which have 
high probabilities of providing useful feedback and relying on step by step 
sequential commitments to limit risk (Lindblom, 1959). 
But surely the planned action will be more appropriate than the unplanned 
action. Surely coordination requires planning. If plans are primarily extrapola- 
tions of the present as was found by Hunsicker (1980), they may encourage the 
organization to believe that the past trends will predominate, and thus increase 
the tendency to maintain current services and systems to implement policy, 
excluding the possibility of new and potentially more promising activities. 
Planning mechanisms tie into the problems of MBO through the connection 
between plans and sub-unit objectives. Budgets connect plans to objectives at 
all levels of the organization. While some organizational problems may require 
long-range planning, the use of such plans will tend to constrain the potential 
adaptation of the organization, particularly through centralization. 
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In short, the rational planning modes inherent in many MBO systems can be 
dysfunctional. Differing applications could severely constrain mid-level 
managerial freedom and creativity, force rational and consistent organizational 
progress toward inappropriate ends, misdirect managerial incentives, and even 
force an involuntary ‘work to rule’ as defined through the financial manage- 
ment system. No organization can function strictly on the basis of its formal 
procedures. Indeed, a little aggressiveness in applying organizational rules can 
result in a complete stoppage of production as workers wait for all the proper 
papers and procedures to be executed rather than getting on with t!.e job. 
Well intentioned efforts to manage through a carefully detailed MBO system 
could be dysfunctional for the organization. For instance, the federal govern- 
ment in the USA is actively enforcing its policy of minimizing the potential for 
fraud, waste, and abuse. This aggressive stance has generated specific operational 
objectives which have at least three outcomes: 
(1) increased time and money spent documenting and justifying spending, 
(2) increased emphasis on and allocation of resources to auditing the use of 
federal resources, and 
(3) a possible reduction in fraud, waste, and abuse within the federal 
government. 
However, it is an open question whether the dollar savings accruing from the 
third outcome are greater than the costs of the first and second outcomes. 
IDEAS FOR FIXES 
The nicest property of the rationally-based management technique is conceptual 
clarity - it is superficially unambiguous. The alternatives presented in this 
section are not as neat but neither is the world. In addition, some measure of 
caution is warranted in making comments on what should be done by others. 
Organizations that have MBO (or other rationally-based systems) are probably 
suficiently addicted to it that some weakening of the addiction is perhaps far 
more reasonable than attempting to go ‘cold turkey’. Consequently, the 
authors offer some tentative suggestions on improvements to MBO systems 
rather than a completely new system. 
Suggestion One: Loose Couple the MBO System 
Loosely coupled systems refer to systems where the components may be highly 
integrated but the connections between the components are loose. For example, 
in production environments inventories are a way to loosen the coupling between 
production and shipments. Similarly, the planning group should be loosely 
coupled with most of the parts of the organization - it produces nothing the 
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other components of the organization will find uncomfortable to be without in 
the short run. 
In their study of MBO in two hospitals, Covaleski and Dirsmith (1981) 
found that the tightly coupled MBO systems that were originally implemented 
were rejected by the operating personnel. The ability of the hospital admini- 
strative structure to control and direct the operating units of the hospital was 
limited, probably due to the complexities of the relations between medical staff 
and the hospital administration. But the units studied had historically operated 
in a moderately independent manner and had been successhl as judged by the 
hospital management. The imposition of a “pure”, technically rational version 
of MBO [that] represented an understandable response by these two hospitals 
to the need to reduce costs’ (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1981, p. 415) was rejected 
by the staffs and eventually replaced with an intra-unit form of MBO which 
emphasized the development of subunit objectives and their attainment but did 
not attempt to formalize the system into a hospital-wide rational objective 
setting process. 
Thc manager should considcl. whether the management system being used in the organiza- 
tion is in conformi8 with the current or approprzate degree of organizational integration. If 
the organization does not need tight coupling between subunits, why should 
the effort and annoyance of such coupling be forced to comply with the MBO 
ideology? Perhaps objectives should be used at some levels and not others. 
Maybe they should not be used at all. For example, a financial reporting system 
could focus on operating information for the local manager rather than the 
information needs of top management. 
Suggestion Two: Technology of Foolishness 
As March (1976) has argued, it may be that some useful activities cannot be 
justified on the basis of what we know to be a good thing today. That is, if we 
have not tried it, we may not know that it is a good thing. Yet, we may not be 
able to try it if we need to defend it on the basis of today’s objectives. Funda- 
mentally, the technology of foolishness can be viewed as using intuition (Calder, 
1970). 
Perhaps managers should allow subordinates a certain amount of flexibility 
to undertake some activities which are not predefined and which will be 
evaluated as to their usefulness after the fact. That is, managers could be 
expected to undertake activities which would be judged after the fact as to 
whether they were interesting, whether the organization had learned from 
them, and whether they might lead to something the organization should 
value. The financial manager faces the problem of tracking resources used 
while keeping sufficient organizational slack to support such experiments 
(Dyckman, 1981) or segregating specific funds for such experiments, but if 
some degree of slack is supported by the top level of the organization, tracking 
problems are minimized. 
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The point is to free up =sources. Resources to allow managers to do some of 
the useful things they had planned. Long-term systems improvements may re- 
quire short-term costs. Resources to allow managers to take chances on new 
and risky innovations. Zfyou want an innovative and progressive organization, allow 
somefkedom for managers at all levels. 
Suggestion Three: Ke@ Objectives General 
Identify the directions in which improvements should be made rather than the 
specific items to be improved. Avoid tying down staff. Recognize that the staff 
will receive lots of informal feedback on their failings - do not think the MBO, 
or any rationally-based system, is all of it. Thus the honing should be done by 
the person on the spot and kept flexible for the future. It is  better to work towarh a 
vague imperjiect objective than towarh a precise irnpegkt objective. 
EVALUATING RATIONALLY-BASED MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 
While the previous section outlined some possible improvements to the rigid 
application of one rationally-based management technique, the Management 
by Objectives system, these are really untried ideas, not proven methods. On 
the other hand, the development of ‘demonstrated techniques’ requires a 
substantially different focus than much of the current research. Practically 
speaking, managers must rely on their own experience and knowledge to 
answer questions such aa, ‘How does the manager ensure that a particular 
management system promotes behaviors that meet organizational objectives?’ 
As a first step, the financial manager might adopt a cost-benefit framework 
for the analysis of management systems with the recognition that the relevant 
costs and benefits are probably more related to the behavioral impacts of the 
systems than they are to the direct costs of the system itself. Currently a standard 
analysis of costs would include design, implementation, and operating costs in 
terms of personnel employed directly by the system; the benefits would be 
assumed to be due to the provision of important and useful information. As 
discussed below, both the costs and benefits are broader than these. 
One of the most important direct costs of a management system may be the 
time that is required to adhere to the system by its users. Consider travel 
control systems for instance. While the normal system analysis would look at 
the cost of personnel in the travel office, a large number of much higher cost 
individuals may each devote moderate to substantial amounts of time completing 
the appropriate forms and dealing with problems. It should be emphasized that 
the analysis must be based on the time allocation as it actually occurs, not on 
some fabled system where all managers are optimally supported by clerical 
staff. Furthermore, if errors in travel forms are a direct personal cost to the 
manager who does travel, managers will have difficulty delegating such duties. 
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Or if (as is often the case), managers are not adequately supported, the forms 
will be completed at great cost to the organization by a highly paid staff. Such 
costs may be substantial. 
On the benefit side, the analyst must begin to address the realized value of 
information. For instance, accountants have a long history of providing infor- 
mation which managers patently ignore and which consequently does not have 
realized value. An empirical assessment of the value of the information as 
actually provided and used is fundamental to addressing the value of a system. 
In light of the cognitive limits to rationality, the problems of information over- 
load, and attention focusing, it is critical to ascertain what the actual use of 
information is and whether it is valuable: 
What are the beneficiaries of the system supposed to do with the information? 
What do they actually do with it? 
What are the perceived incentives and problems of the managers who are 
supposed to use the system? 
What are the intended and unintended secondary impacts of the system? 
To the extent that changes in management systems impact actual managerial 
behavior in unintended ways, the major costs or benefits of the system may 
have little or nothing to do with the intended impacts (Ashton, 1976). For 
instance, a control system for travel may have an intended impact on fraud but 
may also have unintended impacts in influencing the amount of legitimate 
travel. Since no control system is perfectly adapted to all contingencies, it is fair 
to hypothesize that the tighter the control system the more time will be devoted 
to getting around it. Given the high cost of managerial time and the leverage 
inherent in changing decisions, the unintended impacts of a management 
control system could quite easily outweigh the intended impacts (Ashton, 
1976). The point is that the manager needs to address the actual impacts of 
management systems, both the intended ones and the unintended ones. 
SUMMARY 
In spite of the common organizational wisdom that the rational conception of 
organizations is inaccurate, the dominant managerial technologies remain 
essentially rationalistic systems. Rational systems are attractive - they promote 
apparent simplicity, they are logically consistent, and they have desirable 
connotations of reason, logic, and scientific management. But misdirected 
logic is more dangerous perhaps than incremental learning, and apparently 
effective ideas have often proven counterproductive when humans get in to 
mess things up. 
In attempting to provide some alternatives to the rigid rationally-based 
process, the present authors’ proposals lack the elegance and simplicity of 
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rational systems. But real people differ from elegant economic models so it may 
be productive to develop managerial systems which are based on realistic 
assumptions, or at least to blend the economically rational and the humanly 
realistic. Given that rational systems are to be used, the manager must be sure 
that the system facilitates rather than hinders the accomplishment of public 
policy goals. 
NOTES 
1 Set Hayes and Abernathy (1980) and Rappaport (1981) for discussions of the proposition that 
this kind of managerial approach has resulted in a general malaise of myopic management in 
North American industry. 
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